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1 Introduction 
This paper illustrates results concerning an empirical analysis dealing with the 
economic impact of public spending on infrastructure – as recorded in the novel 
Regional Public Accounts (RPA) database- on GDP augmented with corruption. 
 The study differs from existing literature  for three main aspects. 
First, it adopts a random coefficients model (RCM) approach in order to estimate 
the economic impact of public expenditure on infrastructure across Italian regions1.  
The rationale for using a RCM is that a drawback common to studies on 
infrastructures and productivity is that they do not take into account parameters 
heterogeneity (Romp and de Haan, 2007). 
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At first glance, within a regional context, differences involving infrastructures’ 
impact on economic performance could make little sense, however in the Italian 
regional setting characterised by economic dualism such kind of analysis might be of 
some interest in explaining differences in economic performance systematically 
reported across northern and southern regions.   
Second, it uses an “objective” proxy for corruption proposed by Golden and 
Picci (2005) as explanatory variable. Indeed, many theoretical considerations lead 
scholars on this field to think that, in general, social capital matters (Putnam, 1993). 
Public infrastructure spending, in particular, “are the classic locus of illegal monetary 
activities between public officials […] and businesses” (Golden and Picci, 2005). 
Moreover, there are reasons to assume that corruption and  public investment vary 
together (Rose-Ackerman, 1999) or, more generally, that corruption modifies patterns 
of public spending (Mauro, 1998; Coppier, 2005; Shaw, Katsaiti et al., 2007).  
Nevertheless, studies already realised use measure of corruption based either on 
surveys or, on number of crimes against the public administration (regarding the Italian 
case see Del Monte and Papagni 2001, 2007), although both measure presents some 
intrinsic weakness: the former being susceptible to be affected by sample selection or to 
become self-referential and, the latter, to reflect rather than the effective level of 
corruption the effectiveness of judiciary power in fighting corruption (Golden and Picci, 
2005) 
Hence, the interest to use an objective measure of corruption like the one 
introduced by Golden and Picci (2005), based on the difference between a measure of 
the physical quantities of public infrastructure and the cumulative price government 
pays for public capital stocks2.  
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The third novelty is represented by the use of RPAs. Indeed, under the project of 
RPAs data on  public spending for each region divided by  level of government and 
economic sectors are available giving the possibility for more accurate analysis with 
respect to previous works both in terms of reference universe and sector detail. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. A descriptive analysis of data is 
provided in section 2;  section 3 shows results of some preliminary tests regarding 
typical data-related problems: endogeneity, multicollinearity, and, stationarity. Once 
concluded this preliminary analysis, section 4 illustrates results achieved by RCMs 
regression; section 5 deals with the robustness of result regarding the proxy for 
corruption here utilised. Section 6 develops some concluding remarks.  
 
2 A descriptive analysis of data. 
This section a briefly describes data utilised in the empirical analysis developed further.  
The number of years covered spans over a 10 year period from 1996 to 2006. 
The dependent variable is regional GDP per capita taken from ISTAT (various years), 
while public expenditure’s explanatory variables come from the RPAs.  
During the sample considered the public sector as a whole spent on average 
766.736 millions of Euros with an increase of 49,51% with respect to the initial year 
considered.  
Regarding  the expenditure composition by level of government, the central 
government spent a share around 50-60% with a clear tendency towards its reduction 
(62% in 1996 and 51% in 2006).  
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Despite the political discussion on “devolution”, regional administrations spent 
on average,  95.924 millions of Euros, with a share that, although increasing, is still 
around 10-13% of total expenditure.   
Central public corporations, with an average expenditure of 129.781, account for 
a share of 15-20% (22% in 2006) confirming  a strong role in delivering public goods 
and services and, in turn, public  policy. 
Going more into the detail should be noted that although RPAs classify public 
spending in 30 sectors, in order to deal with a lower number of explanatory variables, 
expenditure in capital account are grouped into four macro-sectors reflecting as many 
forms of government intervention, namely: economic infrastructure (EI), human capital 
(HC), social infrastructure (SI), and, residential building (RB).  For the composition of 
each sector see Volpe (2007). 
 When not stated differently, in what follows variables are always expressed in 
per capita terms. Moreover, lower-case variables refers to variables expressed in natural 
logarithm.   
Figure 1 (a)-(d)  report the average value of per capita expenditure in each      
macro-sector during the period from 1996 to 2006. The upper part could be interpreted 
as representing public effort in providing territories with production-oriented 
infrastructure. Namely:  economic infrastructures and human capital,  while the lower 
part of the same figure (c)-(d) concerns social policy infrastructures: residential building 
and social infrastructure. 
Certainly, a detailed analysis of pattern of public expenditure in infrastructure as 
emerge from graph reported below, goes further the purpose of present section. Reader 
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interested in this argument are addressed to a document of the DPS edited by  Servizio 
Progetti Studi e Statistiche (2007). 
 
Figure 1- Public Expenditure on infrastructures. Macro-sectors, average (1996-2006). 
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Nevertheless, as general considerations, can be noted - from figure 1(a) -  that 
Valle D’Aosta, Trentino, Sardinia, and, Basilicata spend more than the national average 
in the key sector to regional development represented by economic infrastructures. 
Considering the system as a whole, except – to some extent - Sicily and Puglia, emerges 
a generalised effort in order to endow with economic infrastructure southern regions. 
Expenditure on residential building follows more or less a similar pattern. With respect 
to human capital and social infrastructures it is worth to remark  the result concerning 
Valle D’Aosta, Friuli, and Trentino which spend more than northern regions and 
generally more than average expenditure relative to the whole northern macro-area. 
However, as noted in the DPS’ document cited above, data regarding social 
infrastructures are strongly influenced by expenditure in general administration, and 
once eliminated this sector differences become weaker.  Among southern regions 
Basilicata and Sardinia shows a level expenditure generally higher than others in the 
same geographical area.  
Figure 2 aims to give an intuitive image of patterns registered in public 
expenditure. 
Figure 2 - Relationships between different macrosectors 
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Generally speaking data show a clear positive relationship between economic 
infrastructure and social ones. Economic infrastructure is also positively correlated with 
residential building expenditure, but is negatively correlated with expenditure in human 
capital which, in turn, is negatively correlated with residential building.  Table 1 below 
reports the whole set of correlations concerning macro-sectors of public spending and 
their correlation with GDP showing that infrastructure spending is positively correlated 
with all four categories of infrastructures considered.  
 
Table 1. Public expenditure on infrastructure correlation matrix  
 GDP EI HC SI RB 
GDP 1     
EI 0,39 1    
HC 0,27 -0,18 1   
SI 0,53 0,83 0,03 1  
RB 0,07 0,27 -0,26 0,30 1 
 
This fact can be seen as a preliminary confirmation of the argument that a region well 
endowed with infrastructure has a relative advantage in terms of economic performance.  
However, the direction of causality has to be tested. Next section  deals with public 
expenditure endogeneity and other data related problems.  
 
3  Preliminary tests  
This section deals with some typical data-related problem concerning public 
infrastructure and economic performance (for a review of data gaps and problems see 
Infrastructure Canada, 2007, p.44).  
The first problem analysed concerns public expenditure (potential) endogeneity. 
Indeed,  public infrastructures exogeneity with respect to (different measure of) 
9 
 
productivity is one of most debated point on empirical analysis concerning the 
economic impact of infrastructures. 
The main argument used in order to question the hypothesis of infrastructure 
exogeneity is based on the idea that GDP might affect infrastructure in the sense that the 
higher the level of GDP the higher the demand for infrastructure.  
In order to test for endogeneity both the Wu (1973)-Hausman (1978) and Durbin 
(1954)-Wu (1973)-Hausman (1978) were performed using as instruments the one-
period-lagged variables (l1ei, l1hc, l1rb, l1si). 
 The rationale for using lagged values of public expenditure is supported by 
theoretical arguments based on incremental budgeting theory (Wildasky, 1975; 
Dempster and Wildasky, 1982).  
From the strict econometric side, chosen instruments do not cast considerable 
doubts: the  Anderson (1951)’s  underidentification statistic shows that the model is 
identified, that is to say that, as expected, instruments are "relevant" in the sense that 
they are  correlated with (assumed) endogenous regressors, and the Sargan (1958)-
Hansen (1982)’s J statistic for overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null 
hypothesis that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (and that the 
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation).  
 
Table 2. Underidentification and Overidentification tests. 
      
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 19,875 
   Chi-sq(1) p-value 0,000 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) 0.000 
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Results of endogeneity tests are reported in table 3 below. 
 Table 3- Tests for endogeneity of hc ei si rb. 
      
Wu-Hausman F test                                                                       F(4,190) 
p-value 
1.395 
0,237 
     
Durbin -Wu-Hausman Chi-sq test                                               Chi-sq(4) 
p-value 
5,708 
0,222 
 
Both tests do not reject the null hypothesis that all categories of public infrastructure 
are exogenous at a high level of significance not rejecting, in turn, the principal 
hypothesis that infrastructures are (exogenous variables and) not accommodating 
factors. 
An additional potential problem in this field is represented by multicollinearity. 
Indeed,  it is likely that expenditures on public infrastructures are highly correlated: 
“wealthier” regions  tend to spend more on everything, and “poorer” regions spend less 
on everything. Not surprisingly, it can be difficult to estimate the effect of any particular 
expenditure category on GDP. 
However, the variables under consideration fulfill the threshold of Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and  tolerance (1/VIF) in order to individuate excessive or 
serious multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007) also when the proxy for corruption is 
included. Therefore, under this aspect, the four sectors can be used as explanatory 
variables being confident that results of analyses are quite solid on statistical grounds. 
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Table 4. VIF and tolerance of four macro-sectors of public infrastructure 
Variable                  VIF               1/VIF 
rb 1.27 0,79 
corr 1,40 0,71 
ei 3,69 0,27 
hc 4,53 0,22 
si 7,83 0,13 
 
Although the sample considered in this work is “too short” to properly consider the 
problem of data stationarity, an analysis of stationarity of data concerning gdp ei si hc is 
performed. The test utilised is the Im, Pesaran et al. (2003) (IPS) test for unit roots in 
panel data because of many desirable properties (Konya, 2001) with respect to other 
available tests (Levin and Lin, 1992; Maddala and Wu, 1999; Quah 1994). Table 5 
shows results concerning the tests under discussion.  
 
Table 5- Unit roots IPS test  
Variable Lags Im, Pesaran e 
Shin (t-bar) 
P-value 
gdp 1 -1.896 0.040 
ei 1 -1.915 0.033 
hc 1 -2.078 0.005 
si 1 -1.941 0.026 
 
 
From table 5 it emerges that for all variables considered the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity is rejected at significance level of 5%.  Once more,  should be noted that 
this result could be heavily influenced by the length of the sample considered. 
 Nonetheless, since all tests performed give the expected result the analysis can 
be performed being confident that its results is not affected by endogeneity, 
multicollinearity, and, data non-stationarity problems. 
12 
 
4 Estimation results 
This section shows result concerning the estimation of the economic impact of 
infrastructure on gdp across Italian regions augmented with corruption.  
 Moving form Baltagi, Song et al. (2001) - that  estimate a Cobb–Douglas 
production function examining the productivity of public capital in each state’s private 
output - the estimation utilises a RCM, with the precise purpose to capture 
heterogeneity across Italian regions.  
The interest for this issue comes from the consideration that parameter 
heterogeneity is not yet well explored in literature leading Romp and de Haan(2007) to 
assert that   
although economists often test the residuals of their regressions for heteroskedasticity 
and structural change […]. Unfortunately, none of the studies reviewed [by them] take 
the issues of model uncertainty and outliers and parameters heterogeneity seriously into 
account, which casts considerable doubt on their findings ( Romp and de Haan, 2007).         
  
Furthermore, the Italian regional case is particularly interesting due to the 
persistent economic dualism still present despite the massive amount of capital spent in 
order to fill the gap. At this regard it is worth noting that a policy objective, concerted 
with the EU,  consists in assigning a share of  45% of total expenditure in capital 
account to southern regions.  
The analysis is augmented with a proxy for corruption proposed by Golden and 
Picci (2005), based on the  difference between a measure of the physical quantities of public 
infrastructure and the cumulative price government pays for public capital stocks, to empirical 
test the theoretical argument that corruption is a relevant structural factor in explaining 
different economic performance across Italian region. For the best of my knowledge this 
is the first work using this measure since its proposition in 2005. 
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The general equation is given by3  
 




DLADgdppopden
corrhcsieigdp iiiiii
9876
54321
200196
 
 
(1) 
 
where ei, si, and hc represent public expenditure in infrastructure as already defined. As 
already said, the variable corr represent the proxy for corruption proposed by Golden 
and Picci (2005) rearranged in order to render more intuitive the interpretation of its 
coefficient. The question might be explained as follows. Since, the measure of 
corruption is inversely scaled – in the sense that it has lower numbers for higher levels 
of corruption- if empirical analysis should confirm (as it does) that corruption has a 
negative effect on gdp, this fact will result in a positive coefficient for it. An easy way 
to “correct” this counterintuitive fact consists in taking the inverse of the original 
measure, so that a negative effect on gdp will result in a negative coefficient for 
corruption in the regression analysis. A second, and last, computational transformation 
adopted consist in multiplying it by 100 in order to avoid negative values of corruption 
in taking logarithm. Following three variable might be thought as a set of control 
variables. The variable labelled as popden represents the population density trying to 
capture general development characteristics of each region; gdp96 represents the level  
of gdp at the beginning of the period considered; D2001 represents a year’s dummy 
relative to the constitutional reform in a federalist sense realised in 20014; DLA is 
region dummy relative to region Lazio to take into account that all expenses not 
regionalised are assigned to this last region. 
 Moving from the basic equation introduced above four alternative regressions 
have been considered, each one obtained letting the intercept and respectively the 
coefficient for  ei, si, hc, and corr vary according to a RCM setting5. In other words, for 
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each alternative regression the intercept is estimated as a fixed part common to all 
regions and a random part region-specific, thus in symbols we have 
ii 111    
where i0  is a random intercept component and the coefficient relative to variable from 
time to time considered is determined as  
jijji    
where ij  is a random slope component.  
 Models of the type just specified have several potential desirable features when 
used for analysis concerning heterogeneous cross-section units. In particular, they might 
represent a “good” solution for data clustering given that not only the intercept might 
vary, but the slopes may be an issue also. Therefore, if slopes and intercepts vary, a 
random coefficients model may fit better.  
Furthermore, we could be interested in analysing variations across observational 
units per se, focusing the analysis on the different pattern of impact of the independent 
variable(s) rather than to (the prediction of) the dependent variable.  
Certainly, the difference between analysis focusing on the prediction of the 
dependent variable and those focusing on the impact of explanatory is subtle. 
Nevertheless, the second research question might be of some interest in context like the 
Italian regional case characterised by a strong north-south dualism despite different ad 
hoc political measure – like the famous “Cassa per il  Mezzogiorno” instituted in 1950 
or the recent  rule of 45% cited above - designed to fill the gap6.       
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 Table 6 below reports estimation results concerning both the fixed part of 
coefficients - j in terms of the theoretical framework introduced above- and the 
standard deviation of the random parameters for each variable estimated using the RCM 
estimation method.  
Table 6.  Public Infrastructure impact on gdp. P-value in parenthesis. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Gdp Regression 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
corr -0.424263 
(0.000) 
[0,050] 
 
-0.3857345 
(0.000) 
[0,068] 
 
-0.4030503 
(0.000) 
[0,062] 
 
-0.3672979 
(0.000) 
[0,062] 
 
ei 0.1514033 
(0.000) 
[0,024] 
 
0.1501155 
(0.000) 
[0,027] 
 
0.1630842 
(0.000) 
[0,025] 
 
0.1587971 
(0.000) 
[0,025] 
 
hc 0.1427796 
(0.000) 
[0,044] 
 
0.1370628 
(0.000) 
[0,047] 
 
0.1323167 
(0.000) 
[0,052] 
 
0.1608181 
(0.000) 
[0,051] 
 
si 0.3164714 
(0.000) 
[0,034] 
 
0.3402164 
(0.000) 
[0,035] 
 
0.3382694 
(0.000) 
[0,034] 
 
0.3097269 
(0.000) 
[0,045] 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
random slope 0,162 0,393 0,109 0,085 
random 
intercept 
0,802 0,236 0,656 0,548 
Note: Mixed effects – REML regression with 220 observations and 20 groups (regions). Values reported 
in bold refer to variable for which from time to time was estimated also the random coefficient.  
 
 Estimates synthetically reported in table 6 shows that all variables are 
statistically significant and show the expected sing.  
Indeed, all categories of public infrastructure have a positive impact on gdp. 
Economic infrastructures (ei), in particular, have coefficients essentially comparable to 
that (0.13)  obtained by Marrocu, Paci et al. (2006) using the same dataset of RPA but a 
different methodology and also with different data and sample.     
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Focusing on the elasticity of the proxy for corruption emerges that it is  higher 
than relative to public infrastructures and, in particular, of magnitude comparable - in 
absolute value - to that relative to social infrastructure. At this regard it is worth to note 
that also in Del Monte and Papagni (2001), although with a different estimation method,  
the coefficient for corruption – in their work measured as the number of crime against 
the public administration- is comparable in absolute value to their estimate relative to 
the share of the real public investment (considered as a whole) in the real GDP. The two 
coefficients being respectively -.138 and .156. Therefore, results obtained in this work 
confirms that corruption plays a significant role in affecting  the economic performance 
of Italian regions.  
In order to test the effective advantage of using a RCM approach compared to 
OLS a likelihood-ratio (LR) test comparing the fitted mixed model to standard 
regression with no group-level random effects was performed for each regression. The 
null hypothesis of the test is that the random part of the parameter - ji in the notation 
adopted here - is zero. Thus, rejection of the null hypothesis can be interpreted in the 
sense that a RCM is preferable.  
Preliminarily should be noted that due to technical complications7, while we can 
compute the exact distribution of the test in the one random parameter case (Self and 
Liang, 1987), an appropriate and sufficiently general computation methods for the 
more-than-one-parameter case have yet to be developed. Nonetheless,  theory (e.g. 
Stram and Lee, 1994) and empirical studies (e.g.  McLachlan and Basford, 1988) have 
demonstrated that, whatever the distribution of the LR test statistic, its tail probabilities 
are bounded above by those of the chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the full number of restricted parameters. Therefore, using as reference 
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distribution the chi-squared with full degrees of freedom  a conservative test is 
produced. The reported significance level for the LR test is an upper bound on the actual 
significance level.  As such, rejection of the null hypothesis based on the reported level 
would imply rejection based on the actual level. 
 Once aware of these technical problems we can pass to results. Table 7 
below shows result for each regression. The first column should be read in the sense 
that result refers to a regression in which the random intercept and the coefficient 
relative to the variable reported in it have been treated as “random”. 
    Table 7. LR test vs. linear regression 
Variable Lr-test 
Chi-sq (2) 
p-value 
 
corr 96.39 0.000 
ei 90.59 0.000 
hc 93.30 0.000 
si 92.04 0.000 
 
All tests performed shows that the null hypothesis of inexistence of difference in 
parameters across region has to be rejected, reinforcing theoretical consideration leading 
to the use of a RCM.  
Hence, it is worth focusing the attention to the random part of coefficients8 - ji  
in terms of the theoretical framework introduced above - and considering the correlation 
between coefficients predicted  in the four regression considered we obtain the 
following correlation matrix in which r_.1 represents the random slope for each 
variable, while r_.0 represents the random intercept predicted in the regression in which 
the relative variable was allowed to have a random slope. To be clearer, r_corr1 – for 
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example - represents the random slope(s) for the proxy for corruption (corr) predicted 
after regression (1), while r_corr0 represents the random intercept(s) predicted after the 
same regression (1).   
Table 8. Random coefficient (BLUPs) correlation matrix. 
         
 r_ei1 r_ei0 r_corr1 r_corr0 r_hc1 r_hc0 r_si1 r_si0 
r_ei1 1        
r_ei0 -0,9347* 1       
r_corr1 -0,2505* 0,1421* 1      
r_corr0 0,2505* -0,1421* -1* 1     
r_hc1 0,5751* -0,7101* -0,0820 0,0820* 1    
r_hc0 -0,4634* 0,6380* 0,0393 -0,0393* -0,9892* 1   
r_si1 0,4331* -0,5765* -0,1556* -0,1556* 0,8681* -0,8704* 1  
r_si0 -0,2825* 0,4732* 0,0844 -0,0844 -0,8313* 0,8604* -0,9827* 1 
*5% level of significance 
 
Table 8 gives rise to some interesting observations. At first glance, it shows that 
random slopes and random intercept are negatively correlated for all variables 
considered. Therefore, the higher the intercept the lower the slope and vice versa. This 
fact could be interpreted – to some extent - as evidence  of “convergence” in the impact 
of public expenditure, in the sense that, ceteris paribus, higher intercept are associated 
with flatter curves.    
Furthermore, focusing the attention to the random slopes can be observed that 
random slopes regarding infrastructures are significantly positively correlated each 
other. The interpretation in terms of policy that might be done to this last result  is in 
favour to a policy of balanced growth – as opposed to unbalanced growth - whereby many 
interdependent public investment projects are started simultaneously based on the principal 
justification of external economies (Hansen, 1965).   
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Enlarging the analysis to corruption, the same table shows that random slopes relative to 
all categories of infrastructure considered are negatively correlate to random coefficient for 
corruption meaning that the lower9 the “correction” for corruption the higher the “correction” 
relative to infrastructure (let say economic infrastructure). This fact can be generally interpreted 
in terms of the theoretical argument that the negative effect of corruption could prevail 
when, due to infrastructures scarcity, the productivity of public spending is high, so that 
corruption, stealing public resource to high-productivity-infrastructures, exerts its 
negative effect in a more incisive way (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001). 
Obviously analysis of correlation between complete coefficients  ( jijji   ) will 
result in identical pattern and is not reported.  
Focusing the attention to the geographical distribution of random effects a test 
for spatial autocorrelation of random coefficient and random slopes has been performed. 
Table 9 below shows that the hypothesis of spatial independence of random effects of 
corruption should be rejected.  
Table 9. Moran’s I Spatial correlogram for Random slope of corruption (BLUP).   
Distance 
bands 
I E(I) sd(I) z p-value* 
(1-2] -0,099 -0,005 0,018 -5,167 0,000 
(1-3] -0,113 -0,005 0,012 -9,205 0,000 
(1-4] -0,201 -0,005 0,008 -24,043 0,000 
(1-5] -0,049 -0,005 0,007 -6,669 0,000 
*2-tail test 
Furthermore, the hypothesis of spatial independence has to rejected for all 
random coefficients.  Probably, the simplest interpretation of this last result is in  term 
of spill over effects between neighbour regions.  
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A test for spatial autocorrelation of residuals relative to each regression was also 
run in order to individuate an eventual systematic bias in capturing the effect of 
variables considered based on geographical ground.  
The most commonly used specification test for spatial autocorrelation is derived 
from a statistic, already used,  developed by Moran (1948, 1950a, 1950b). Following 
Anselin (1999) the Moran’s I statistic, in matrix notation,  can expressed as follows  
 


'
'
0
W
S
NI   
 
 
where N is the number of geographical units considered, 
i j
ijwS0 is a 
standardization factor that corresponds to the sum of the weights for the non-zero cross-
products,   indexed the vector of residuals, and W is a spatial weights matrix.  
 Moran’s I tests have been computed both in the cumulative and in the  
consecutive case for five different distance bands for each regression and none of tests 
performed reject the null hypothesis of spatial independence of residuals. This fact can 
be interpreted as evidence that our RCMs do “a good job” in capturing systematic 
differences (especially) between northern and southern regions. 
 
5 The robustness of result concerning corruption.  
 
In order to test the validity of result reported above, in this section, I compare results 
achieved with the measure of corruption utilised in regressions presented above with 
those obtained using, everything else be equal,  the Putnam’s index10 (putnamindex) and 
geographical latitude (LAT) 11 as additional controls. 
The rationale for using these two control is twofold.  
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 First, with regard to corruption appendix A (available upon request) shows that 
the measure of corruption here utilised is significantly spatial correlated. Therefore, one 
could doubt  that - once considered as control - it rather than capturing the effect of 
corruption acts a sort of  “geographical control”. If so, introducing an explicit measure 
of geographical latitude should result in a statistical insignificance of the measure of 
corruption because of a better explicative power of a precise geographical control with 
respect to a variable that acts as its proxy.   
 Second, the use of Putnam’s index makes sense because it represents a direct – 
as opposed to the indirect measure given by corruption - proxy of social capital for 
which regional-level data are available and about which a relatively more secure 
knowledge can be assumed. Even if the measure are strictly correlated (Golden and 
Picci, 2005) introducing this direct measure in our regression could be interpreted as a 
test for the explicative power of the indirect measure of social capital represented by 
corruption. 
 Nevertheless, neither the measure for geographical latitude nor the Putnam’s 
index are statistical significant in the regressions where also the measure of corruption 
is introduced both in the case in which they are considered together (i.e. corr-
putnamindex-LAT) and in the case in which they are considered one at time (i.e. corr-
putnamindex and corr-LAT)12.   
 Nonetheless, at margin should be noted that the Putnam index became 
statistically significant when considered separately and, in particular, it has the expected 
(positive) sign when considered separately.  
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The fact that LAT is statistically insignificant implies that a difference in the 
economic impact of infrastructure based merely on geographical ground should be 
rejected. 
 Combining these empirical evidences can be drown the conclusion that although 
social capital - systematically higher in northern regions than in the southern ones - 
matters, once considered the proxy for corruption, results became more robust in the 
sense that corruption is statistically significant and with the expected sign in a set  of 
specifications broader than the one characterising the two alternative variable here 
considered.   
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I empirically analysed the economic impact of economic of public 
spending on infrastructure combined with the analysis concerning the role of corruption 
in this field by means of a set of random coefficient models. 
 Random coefficients have been estimated for three different categories of public 
infrastructures: economic infrastructures, human capital infrastructures, and, social 
infrastructures. Moreover, a different effect of corruption across regions was estimated. 
Tests based on likelihood-ratio show that the null hypothesis of inexistence of 
difference in parameters across regions has to be rejected for all variables cited above.  
 A Moran’s test for spatial autocorrelation of random effects predicted for each 
variable considered was performed showing that, in general, the impact of public 
spending on infrastructures is spatial correlated.  
This evidence combined with the argument that “casual observation [supported 
with appropriate tests] suggests that, in Italy, infrastructure construction costs should be 
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relatively uniform in different parts of the country” (Golden and Picci, 2005) could be 
interpreted as  a confirmation of  the existence of differences based not only on different 
amounts of infrastructure spending but also based on their effects. 
 Focusing the attention to the effects of corruption it emerges that the objective 
proxy for it utilised in this work negatively affects the economic performance of Italian 
regions. Moreover its negative effect, like the effect of infrastructure spending, is 
spatially correlated.  
 Both phenomena could be interpreted as consistent with the theoretical 
arguments developed in this field (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001). Indeed, the negative 
effect of corruption is higher when productivity of public spending is high. In other 
words, corruption exerts its negative effect in a way more incisive when stealing public 
resource to high-productivity-infrastructures. 
 In order to test the robustness of result reported above I compared results 
achieved with the measure of corruption utilised with those obtained using, everything 
else be equal,  the Putnam’s index and geographical latitude as additional controls 
representing a direct measure of social capital and a direct geographical control. 
The robustness analysis shows that differences based merely on geographical 
bases should be rejected. Regarding the social capital, even though it matters, once 
considered the proxy for corruption results became more robust. 
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Notes 
                                               
1 All multilevel analyses described in this paper were implemented in Stata© 10.0 using the "xtmixed" 
command, “cmdlog” file available upon request  Two details about model specification are worth noting 
here. First, no assumptions were made about the structure of the covariance matrix. Rather, all variances 
and covariances were distinctly estimated. Second, all models were estimated using restricted maximum 
likelihood (REML) over maximum likelihood (ML) since the latter is more sensitive to loss of degrees of 
freedom when dealing with a small number of groups (Snijders and Boskers, 1999). 
2 The issue of the interpretation of this measure as corruption rather than as a measure of  efficiency is 
developed  in length by the Authors, therefore readers interested in this peculiar aspect are addressed to 
Golden and Picci (2005). 
3 The variable related to residential building expenditure (RB) is not statistically significant according to 
many different specifications. 
4 Cost. L. 2001, n. 3 "Modifiche al titolo V della parte seconda della Costituzione". Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 
248,  24th October 2001. 
5 Due to computational difficulties estimating all coefficients as random is not possible.  
6 For a review of Italian regional development  measures see ch.15 of   Cellini, R., Ed. (2004). Politica 
economica. Introduzione ai modelli fondamentali Milano, McGraw-Hill.  
7 The question can be summarised as follows. As said the LR test assesses whether all random-effects 
parameters of the mixed model are simultaneously zero. In the one random-effects parameter case, this 
parameter, a variance component in Stata™ terms, is restricted to be greater than zero.  Since the null 
hypothesis is that this parameter is indeed zero, which is on the boundary of the parameter space, the 
distribution of the LR test statistic is a 50:50 mixture of a chi2(0) (point mass at zero) and a chi2(1) (point 
mass at one) distribution.  Therefore, significance levels in   the one-parameter case can be adjusted 
accordingly. However, when we have more than one random-effects parameter to be tested, the 
distribution to be considered becomes unclear.  In a model where we have two random coefficients with 
unstructured covariance matrix of random parameter ji (both relative to intercept and slope) 







2221
1211


S  
for example, since the "random" component of the mixed model comprises three parameters 
( 11 , 21 , 22 ), it would appear that the LR comparison test would be distributed as chi2(3).  However, 
there are two complications that need to be considered. First, the variances 11  and 22  are restricted to 
be positive, and testing them against zero presents the same boundary condition described above.  
Second, constraints such as 011  implicitly restrict the covariance 22 to be zero as well, and from a 
technical standpoint it is unclear how many parameters need to be restricted to reduce the model to one 
with no group-level random effects. 
8 Predicted by Best Linear Unbiased Linear Predictors (BLUPs). 
9 Note that corruption has negative coefficients and note also that random slope and random intercept 
relative to corruption are perfectly (negatively) correlated. 
10 Data on Putnam index courtesy of Robert Putnam. Note also that even if there is an obvious temporal 
gap between Putnam’s measure, constructed using data from the period 1978–1985, and data here 
considered  a comparison between the original measure and a more recent (1990–1994) study due to 
Simoni(1997), updating Putnam’s index, shows that it is relatively unchanged since the period of original 
data collection and can be considered as characterized by a strong persistence. 
11 Both for Moran’I linear geographic coordinates and for the geographical latitude as control I utilised  
data relative to Italian waypoint available at http://xoomer.alice.it/ntpal/GPS/ISTAT/links.html 
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